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Abstract
We first introduce structural realism as a position in the metaphysics of science, pointing out the
way in which this position replaces intrinsic properties with relations so that it amounts to a
holistic in contrast to an atomistic metaphysics. We argue in favour of a moderate version of
structural realism that puts objects and relations on the same ontological footing and assess the
general philosophical arguments for this position. The second section shows how structural
realism gains support from quantum physics. The third section explains how structural realism
can be applied to the metaphysics of space-time.
1. Structural realism as a metaphysical position
Structural realism in the metaphysics of science is a sort of a holism in contrast to an
atomism. To bring out that contrast, consider David Lewis’ thesis of Humean supervenience;
one can regard that thesis as the paradigmatic conception of a philosophical atomism in
current mainstream analytical metaphysics:
Humean supervenience is named in honor of the greater denier of necessary connections. It is
the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just
one little thing and then another. (…) We have geometry: a system of external relations of
spatio-temporal distance between points. Maybe points of spacetime itself, maybe point-sized
bits of matter or aether or fields, maybe both. And at those points we have local qualities:
perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a point at which to be
instantiated. For short: we have an arrangement of qualities. And that is all. (Lewis (1986), ix-x)
According to Lewis, thus, the only irreducible relations are the ones of spatio-temporal
distance between points. The fundamental physical 11 properties are instantiated at those
points. One may think of mass, energy, momentum, charge, spin among others as candidates
for fundamental physical properties. It is of no importance for this position whether (a) the
space-time points themselves instantiate the fundamental physical properties, or whether (b)
there are material objects located at the space-time points that instantiate these properties, or
whether (c) there are no space-time points at all, the spatial-temporal relations being relations
among material point particles that instantiate the fundamental physical properties.
What is crucial for this position is that the fundamental physical properties are intrinsic
properties. According to the standard view developed by Lewis himself, intrinsic are all and
only those properties that an object has irrespective of whether or not there are other
contingent objects; in brief, having or lacking an intrinsic property is independent of
accompaniment or loneliness (see Langton & Lewis (1998) and for a refinement Lewis
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(2001)). All other properties are extrinsic or relational, consisting in the object bearing certain
relations to other objects. The view hence is that the world is the distribution of fundamental
physical intrinsic properties at points that are connected by spatio-temporal relations. This
view is an atomism. The world consists of atoms in a philosophical sense, namely a plurality
of objects that are characterized by certain intrinsic properties each and that are linked only by
spatio-temporal relations.
There is an obvious epistemological problem for this position that is acknowledged by
Lewis himself (see Lewis (forthcoming)): if the fundamental physical properties are intrinsic
ones, how can we get knowledge of them? Frank Jackson brings out this problem in the
following passage:
When physicists tell us about the properties they take to be fundamental, they tell us what these
properties do. This is no accident. We know about what things are like essentially through the
way they impinge on us and our measuring instruments. It does not follow from this that the
fundamental properties of current physics, or of ‘completed’ physics, are causal cum relational
ones. It may be that our terms for the fundamental properties pick out the properties they do via
the causal relations the properties enter into, but that at least some of the properties so picked out
are intrinsic. They have, as we might put it, relational names but intrinsic essences. However, it
does suggest … the uncomfortable idea that we may know next to nothing about the intrinsic
nature of the world. We know only its causal cum relational nature. (Jackson (1998), 23-24)
12 The core of this argument can be reconstructed as follows: (1) We gain empirical
knowledge owing to the causal relations that obtain between physical objects and our senses.
(2) Knowledge thus gained may refer to intrinsic properties of physical objects. (3) But the
way in which that knowledge is caused imposes a constraint on its content: physical
properties can be identified only through the relations in which they enter. If we explain the
meaning of the propositions that refer to the fundamental physical properties, it turns out that
these propositions describe these properties as relational. (4) Identity of relations, however,
does not imply identity of intrinsic properties. (5) We therefore do not know the properties of
physical objects insofar as they are intrinsic.
The argument is not that since we gain knowledge through the way in which physical
objects impinge on our senses, we know only the way in which they are related to us. The
argument is one about the content of empirical predicates, namely that they reveal only
relations among objects. The argument applies to all relations; the relations in which physical
objects stand to us do not have any special status as far as the content of empirical knowledge
is concerned. The laws of physics, in short, describe relations among physical objects, and
only relations, but without relations of measurement having a special status.
If it is true that our basic physical theories give us knowledge only of the relations in which
physical objects stand, the metaphysics of intrinsic properties is in trouble: metaphysics has it
that the world consists of objects that are characterized by intrinsic properties each. On
epistemological reflection, however, we have to concede that we do not have access to these
properties insofar as they are intrinsic. A gap between metaphysics and epistemology thus
arises.
This problem for the metaphysics of intrinsic properties is a purely philosophical
motivation to go for structural realism. One can reformulate the problem that Jackson among
others raises in such a way that its conclusion is a position known as epistemic structural
realism, namely the view that structure in the sense of relations among physical objects and
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as captured by the mathematical equations of a physical theory is all that we can know.
Epistemic structural realism in the current discussion goes back to a paper that John Worrall
published in 1989 (see in particular 117-123).
Worrall’s aim is to employ epistemic structural realism as an argument to establish a
mitigated version of scientific realism. According to him, there is continuity in our views
about structure despite theory change in the history of science: the views about structure of a
predecessor theory 13 can be construed as an approximation of the views about structure of
the successor theory. Therefore, following Worrall, our views about structure do not fall
victim to the arguments against scientific realism from theory change. That claim is in dispute
(see Psillos (1999), chapter 7, against Worrall). Be that as it may, our concern in this paper is
with the metaphysics of science. We shall therefore not employ structural realism as an
argument for scientific realism, but simply presuppose that a version of scientific realism can
be established that is strong enough to warrant the project of proposing metaphysical claims
based on scientific theories. Of course, these claims then are subject to change in the same
way as are our scientific theories.
Structural realism as a metaphysical position is the claim that there are no fundamental
intrinsic properties underlying the relations that we can know. That is to say, all there is to the
fundamental physical objects are the relations in which they stand. By structure, we mean
concrete physical relations. Structural realism as a stance in the metaphysics of science is
therefore not subject to what is known as the Newman objection against structuralism (see
Demopoulos & Friedman (1985); see Chakravartty (2004), section 3 as regards the point that
concrete relations are not subject to this objection). As a first approximation, one can
conceive structural realism as not touching the objects, but as replacing what is considered as
intrinsic properties of objects in atomism with relations among the objects. However, this is
only a first approximation, for it presupposes that there first are objects as something
ontologically primitive and that these objects then are put into relations with each other
(“first” and “then” in a logical sense, not a temporal one).
The structural realist, by contrast, maintains that objects and relations are on the same
ontological footing. Neither objects nor relations (structure) have an ontological priority with
respect to the physical world: they both belong to the ontological ground floor. It makes no
sense to assign an ontological priority to objects, because instead of having fundamental
intrinsic properties, there are only the relations in which they stand. In other words, an object
as such is nothing but that what bears the relations. As regards the relations, it makes no sense
to attribute an ontological priority to them, for at least insofar as they are instantiated in the
physical world instead of being abstract entities, they exist as relations between objects. Thus,
as far as the physical world is concerned, there is a mutual ontological as well as conceptual
dependence between objects and structure (relations): objects can neither exist nor be
conceived without relations in which they stand, and relations can neither exist in the physical
world nor 14 be conceived as the structure of the physical world without objects that stand in
the relations.
Structural realism is a holism in contrast to an atomism. In atomism, one considers the
world as being composed of atoms in the sense of objects that exist independently of one
another because they are characterized by intrinsic properties each (“local matters of
particular fact, just one little thing and then another”, in the words of David Lewis in the
citation above). Holism, by contrast, can be conceived as regarding the whole world – or the
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domain of the world that one considers – as just one object in the last resort. “Object” here
has the same meaning as in atomism, namely “being that exists independently of other
beings” (this is one sense of the traditional term “substance”). All the properties of that one
object trivially are intrinsic properties, for there is nothing outside that object. Structural
realism rejects only the view of intrinsic properties underlying the relations, not intrinsic
properties of a whole that is the only object in the last resort. It is trivial that any relations
among the parts of a whole can be represented as intrinsic properties of the whole (although
the converse is not the case). However, holism would collapse into atomism if the one whole
did not have an internal structure. The claim would then simply be that there is just one atom.
The notion of an internal structure of the whole is therefore central to holism (see Esfeld
(1998)). The idea is that there is an internal differentiation within the whole such that there
are parts of the whole, and these parts have relational properties, that is, they stand in certain
relations to one another. The parts are objects in a weaker sense than the whole – or an atom –
is: they do not exist independently of one another, but they are subjects of the predication of
properties, namely relational properties, standing in relations. In the following, we shall talk
about the parts of the whole as objects. When we talk about the whole, we explicitly mention
this.
The idea hence is that the objects that are parts of the whole have only relational properties
and no intrinsic ones. In other words, they are nothing but that what stands in the relations.
This idea may seem incoherent. There is a master argument for intrinsic properties that can be
put in this way:
1) Relations require relata, that is, objects that stand in the relations.
2) These objects have to be something in themselves, that is, they necessarily have some
intrinsic properties over and above the relations that they bear to one another – even if the
relations do not 15 supervene on the intrinsic properties and even if we cannot know the
intrinsic properties (see, for instance, Langton (1998), chapter 2, in particular p. 22, who
attributes that argument to Kant).
Structural realism rejects that argument. More precisely, the position that we shall put forward
under the name of moderate structural realism accepts the first claim of this argument, but
refuses to endorse the second one (see Esfeld (2004), section 3, and Esfeld & Lam (2006),
section 1). Whereas the first claim of this argument can be considered as a conceptual truth
(“no relations without relata”), the second claim is clearly not a conceptual truth. It is rather a
prejudice based on simply presupposing atomism. There are strong empirical arguments
stemming from quantum physics and general relativity against that claim. We shall present
these arguments in the second and the third section of this paper.
However, one may wonder whether relations are capable of individuating objects. If there
are objects, don’t they require intrinsic properties as identity condition? Recall that, according
to structural realism as a metaphysical position, (1) objects are not atoms that exist
independently of each other and that (2) structure always consists in certain specific, concrete
relations, these relations being as determinate as intrinsic properties are supposed to be.
Consequently, relations are exactly on the same footing as intrinsic properties as far as
identity conditions are concerned: insofar as intrinsic properties account for identity
conditions, relations can perform that task as well. For instance, if A is bigger than B, heavier
than C, etc., these relations individuate A and distinguish A from B and C. It goes without
saying that there is in structural realism no question of identity conditions for an object
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independently of other objects. But this does not mean that relations cannot provide identity
conditions. Which relations make up for identity conditions for which types of objects
depends obviously on the case under consideration.
Consider an analogy: since Quine’s seminal paper on “Two dogmas of empiricism” (1951)
and the subsequent development of semantic holism (inferential role semantics), we are
familiar with the notion of a web of beliefs. We are used to thinking of beliefs as points in a
web that are individuated by their position in the web, that is, their relations to other beliefs.
Content (meaning) is not an intrinsic property of a belief, but consists in inferential relations
to other beliefs (the same goes for other properties of beliefs such as confirmation or
justification). Semantic holism has no problem in individuating beliefs on that basis: each
belief is defined by its position in 16 the web, being distinguished from all the other beliefs in
the web, for no two beliefs stand in exactly the same relations to all the other beliefs in the
web. The problem is that we do not want any old change of relations in the system to amount
to a change in the content of all the beliefs in the system. Some inferential relations thus have
to be distinguished as being more important than others. But this problem does not touch the
central issue that it is relations that provide the identity conditions for the members of the
system. Structural realism can be received as proposing to transfer this idea from semantics to
metaphysics, the objects being now physical entities instead of beliefs. If this idea is
intelligible in semantics, then so it is in metaphysics.
Hence, insofar as intrinsic properties can provide identity conditions, so can relations.
However, there are cases in physics where neither relations nor intrinsic properties are able to
establish identity conditions. Quantum systems of the same kind whose states are entangled
are indistinguishable (see French & Redhead (1988)), although in the common cases there is a
definite number of them that is greater than one. These systems do not have an identity in
time. An analogous consideration applies to space-time points on certain symmetry
assumptions about space-time: space-time points can stand in exactly the same spatio-
temporal relations and, yet, be of course numerically distinct (see below section 3).
One may receive these cases as speaking against a bundle theory of objects: quantum
systems and space-time points can neither be bundles of intrinsic properties nor can they be
bundles of relational properties; for the intrinsic or relational properties may be as concrete as
is physically possible and, nevertheless, fail to establish a distinction between quantum
systems or space-time points. A bundle theory of objects accords ontological priority to
intrinsic properties or relations over objects: objects are constituted by intrinsic properties or
relations on that theory.
The other big position in the metaphysics of objects apart from the bundle theory is the
view that objects are bare particulars: each object has a primitive thisness (haecceity). It is
that primitive thisness which individuates the object and provides its identity conditions (see
Adams (1979)). Primitive thisness is not a property. It functions rather like a proper name. If
there are one hundred entries under the name “Jones” in a telephone directory, this does not
mean that there are one hundred instantiations of the property of being Jones in the space-time
region to which the telephone directory applies. However, as far as quantum systems are
concerned, one can complain that primitive thisness is a purely metaphysical position for
which 17 there cannot be any empirical argument stemming from science. More importantly,
as far as space-time points are concerned, there is a strong argument against primitive thisness
on which we shall elaborate in section 3, namely the hole argument. The view of each object
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having a primitive thisness accords ontological priority to objects over intrinsic properties or
relations: objects are first constituted by a primitive thisness that provides for their identity
and then equipped with intrinsic properties or put into relations (“first” and “then” in a logical
sense, not a temporal one). The view of objects being constituted by a primitive thisness
stands in opposition to the spirit of structural realism.
The bundle theory and the view of objects as bare particulars are not the only options in the
metaphysics of objects. In the cases where neither intrinsic properties nor relations provide
for identity conditions one can simply accept a numerical distinction (diversity) – among
quantum systems or space-time points – as primitive (a similar view is held by Pooley (2006),
section 4). A numerical distinction tells us that there is a number of objects that is greater than
one – in many cases of quantum entanglement even a definite, finite natural number of
objects –, and that is all that it tells us. A numerical distinction is not a primitive thisness, for
it does not establish an identity in time – or any other sort of an identity – that is not
empirically accessible. Accepting a numerical distinction as primitive is motivated by the
physical cases – quantum entanglement, space-time points – in which there is a plurality of
objects without these objects being distinguished from one another by any intrinsic properties
or relations in which they stand and without primitive thisness being an open way out, since
there are strong physical arguments against primitive thisness. This empirical situation – and
thus the motivation for acknowledging numerical distinction as a primitive – is independent
of structural realism. Any position in the metaphysics of science has to come to terms with
this empirical situation.
Nonetheless, recognizing numerical distinction as a primitive is the reason why we are
committed to the view that objects and relations are interdependent, being on the same
ontological footing: we get the relata and the relations at once as the internal structure of a
whole, neither of them being eliminable or reducible to the other one. Hence, in short, insofar
as there are factors that individuate objects over and above numerical distinction, intrinsic
properties and relations are on a par. If there are no such factors, we either have to accept a
numerical distinction as primitive or we have to go for primitive thisness. Moderate structural
realism is committed to the former view.
18 As the characterization as moderate suggests, there is a more radical version of
structural realism. The view that Steven French and James Ladyman put forward under the
name “ontic structural realism” is a radical metaphysics of structural realism in contrast to the
more moderate position proposed by us, because it rejects both claims of the above mentioned
master arguments for intrinsic properties. According to French and Ladyman, the fact that
quantum systems of the same kind in entangled states are indistinguishable is a good reason to
drop the commitment to objects in metaphysics. They maintain a metaphysics of structural
realism according to which there is only structure in the sense of concrete, physical relations,
but no objects standing in the relations, the objects being dissolved into structure. Their view,
however, has become less radical recently, since they seem to be prepared now to admit
objects as a secondary category, being derived from relations (see Ladyman (1998), French &
Ladyman (2003) for the original view and Ladyman & Ross (2007), chapter 3, in particular
the opening paragraph, as well as French (2006), section 3, in particular first paragraph on p.
6 for more recent, less radical statements. For another version of a radical structural realism
independent of the one of French & Ladyman see Dipert (1997)).
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Be that as it may, if objects are conceived as being derived from relations, one would like
to see how this can be so, given that relations fail to distinguish between objects in the cases
of quantum entanglement and space-time points. And if there are no objects at all, the
complaint is that structural realism runs into absurdity: for the relations to be instantiated in
the physical world, there has to be something that instantiates them, that is, something that
stands in the relations. That is why the first claim of the master argument for intrinsic
properties is a conceptual truth if anything is (as to this objection against the position of
French & Ladyman, see Cao (2003b), Chakravartty (2003), 871–872, Busch (2003), Psillos
(2005), section 2). And that is why the version of structural realism that we endorse puts
objects on the same ontological footing as relations. The difference between the radical
structural realism of French and Ladyman and our more moderate version is, however, a
difference in detail within a common position. The central element of structural realism as a
position in the metaphysics of science is the commitment to relations instead of intrinsic
properties and the rejection of an atomistic in favour of a holistic metaphysics consequent
upon that commitment.
One can put forward three types of arguments for structural realism as a stance in the
metaphysics of science:
• 19 the argument from coherence: Our metaphysics should be coherent with our
epistemology. Postulating intrinsic properties that are unknowable leads to a gap between
metaphysics and epistemology as explained above. Structural realism makes metaphysics
coherent with epistemology: all there is can in principle be known; for all there is are
relations among objects. There is no principled obstacle to the knowledge of relations,
whereas there is a principled obstacle to the knowledge of intrinsic properties (although
all our physical theories are, of course, at best approximately true).
• the argument from parsimony: We have to recognize relations (structure) in our
metaphysics anyway. It is not possible to reduce all relations to intrinsic properties. Even
if, as according to atomism, the world consists of objects whose fundamental properties
are intrinsic ones, there have to be some relations: at least spatio-temporal relations are
not supervenient on – and consequently not reducible to – intrinsic properties (that much
is conceded even by David Lewis in his thesis of Humean supervenience; see the
quotation at the beginning of the paper). On the other hand, it is questionable whether we
have to recognize both relations and intrinsic properties in our metaphysics. Parsimony
(Occam’s razor) tells us that we shall not admit entities beyond necessity. Thus, the claim
is that the metaphysics of structural realism is parsimonious, because it does not recognize
more than is necessary anyway, namely relations (structure).
• the empirical arguments from quantum entanglement and space-time: The argument from
coherence is a general argument that applies to all our knowledge of the physical world,
physics be as it may, saying that there is no reason to suppose that there are fundamental
intrinsic properties. There are two concrete arguments based on our current two
fundamental physical theories that establish a stronger conclusion: the assumption that
there are fundamental intrinsic properties underlying the relations leads to a conflict with
what these theories tell us about the physical world.
Before turning to these arguments and to conclude this section, let us come back to the
contrast between structural realism and David Lewis’ thesis of Humean metaphysics quoted
at the beginning of the paper. A world to which the metaphysics of structural realism applies
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is a world of holism, being tied together by relations that do not supervene on intrinsic 20
properties – by contrast to a world of atomism that is composed of objects that exist
independently of one another, being characterized by intrinsic properties each. However,
holism is not committed to the anti-Humean thesis that there are necessary connections
among distinct entities in the world. The distribution of relations in a world of structural
realism can be contingent in the same way as the distribution of intrinsic properties in David
Lewis’ Hume world.
More precisely, the relations that there are in one part of the world do not have to
necessitate the relations that there are beyond the part of the world considered. To illustrate
this claim by means of an example from non-relativistic quantum mechanics, assume that
there is a state of the world which is an entangled state and that this state develops in time.
Structural realism is compatible with the view that the state of the world at a given time does
not necessitate the state of the world at other times. Thus, structural realism is compatible
with the view that there are no necessary connections among the state of the world at different
times. The dynamics of the development of the state of the world in time may of course be
deterministic (such as the Schrödinger equation). But a Hume world can be deterministic too.
Physical determinism does not imply the view that there are metaphysically necessary
connections in the world.
Consequently, in structural realism as in a Hume world, the laws of nature can be
contingent instead of being metaphysically necessary. The issue of contingency vs.
metaphysical necessity is independent of the issue of intrinsic properties vs. relations.
Structural realism and holism can go with both of these views – in the same way as one can
combine a metaphysics of intrinsic properties with a Humean world view as well as with the
view that there are metaphysically necessary connections in the world (for instance, by
conceiving the fundamental intrinsic properties as powers).
2. The argument from quantum entanglement
If we try to translate David Lewis’ thesis of Humean supervenience into physics, we can
make use of the principle of separability. Einstein based his criticism of quantum mechanics
on this principle (see Einstein (1948) and Howard (1985)). One can characterize separability
in this way: Physical systems have a state each in the sense that (1) this state completely
encompasses the state-dependent properties of the system and (2) the joint state of two or
more systems supervenes on the states which each of these systems has. Physical systems
may be particles, field modes, space-time points, etc. In non-relativistic 21 quantum
mechanics, the state of a system at a time can be conceived as containing the complete
information about the properties of the system at that time, the properties being limited to
those properties whose value can change in time. These are known as state-dependent
properties. Properties such as rest mass and charge, by contrast, are state-independent, since
their value always remains constant. The principle of separability thus conceives the world as
being built up of single systems each of which has a state independently of all the other
systems, and the joint state of two or more systems  – or, in the last resort, the whole world –
supervenes on the states that these systems have independently of each other. In other words,
the relations among the systems supervene on the states that the systems have independently
of each other; consequently, the state-dependent properties are conceived as intrinsic
properties.
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Quantum entanglement violates separability. If the states of two or more quantum systems
are entangled, only the joint state of the whole is a pure state. The parts, the single systems
whose states are entangled, do not have a state each that completely encompasses their state-
dependent properties. Instead of the parts fixing the state of the whole, it is only the joint state
of the whole that completely determines the state-dependent properties of the parts in the
form of certain correlations among these properties, entanglement signifying that there is a
superposition of all the possible correlations. This way of determining the properties of the
parts in the form of correlations among them makes it superfluous to call for intrinsic
properties underlying the correlations. Claiming that there are intrinsic and thus local
properties of the parts that serve as a supervenience base for the correlations would come into
conflict with the fact that the correlations of quantum entanglement violate the theorem of
Bell (1964) (as regards the philosophical importance of that theorem, see e.g. the papers in
Cushing & McMullin (1989)). Quantum mechanics hence is not silent on the issue of whether
or not there may be intrinsic properties underlying the correlations, but contains a strong
argument against any such view.
Quantum non-separability fits into structural realism as sketched out in the first section of
this paper (for a detailed argument in this sense, see Esfeld (2004); see furthermore Teller
(1986), Howard (1989), Healey (1991) on the link with holism and Ladyman (1998) and
French & Ladyman (2003) on the link with structural realism). The way in which the joint
state of the whole determines the state-dependent properties of the parts in the form of certain
correlations confirms the claim of a mutual ontological dependence between objects and
relations: the objects (single quantum systems – “particles” in the framework of non-
relativistic quantum mechanics) cannot 22 be presupposed as simply being there and then
entering into correlations (for instance, through interaction). Quantum entanglement is
generic and fundamental. We cannot but take as fundamental the joint state of the whole, in
the last resort the joint state of the whole world. That state is such that it permits and calls for
an internal differentiation in the form of correlations and thus correlata – although the
correlata are nothing but that what stands in the correlations. We thus get correlations and
correlata as internal differentiation of the world, these two being on the same ontological
footing.
The interpretation of quantum entanglement in terms of holism and structural realism is
independent of the stance that one takes on the measurement problem. If one follows Everett
(1957) in holding that the Schrödinger equation is the complete dynamics of quantum
systems, there only is quantum entanglement. If one modifies the Schrödinger dynamics – as,
for instance, along the lines of the proposal of Ghirardi, Rimini & Weber (1986) – to allow
for state reductions and thus processes of the dissolution of quantum entanglement,
nonetheless, quantum entanglement is fundamental. To the extent that there are pure states of
single quantum systems, they are derived from entanglement.
The argument from quantum entanglement in favour of structural realism can be considered
in a general framework: it takes the physical relation of quantum entanglement as a
fundamental feature of the world – whatever the fundamental objects standing in the relation
are. In particular, the argument is not restricted to non-relativistic quantum theory. It applies
in the framework of (relativistic) quantum field theory (QFT) as well, according to which
entanglement is a fundamental feature of nature too (see Clifton & Halvorson (2001)). In
other words, the structural realist interpretation is not tied to any particular ontology of basic
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entities; as regards QFT, quantum field systems can play the role of objects among which the
relations of quantum entanglement obtain (where a quantum field system can be understood
basically as a specified bounded open region of space-time in which some field properties are
instantiated). Therefore, the argument from quantum entanglement for structural realism is
independent of the “particle ontology vs. field ontology” debate in the philosophy of quantum
field theory (in favour of a field ontology, see Huggett (2000) and Cao (2003a) for instance;
for a more cautious stance based on some physical considerations, see Halvorson
(forthcoming), sections 4 and 6).
The important point is that the relation of quantum entanglement is fundamental within
quantum theory, for both relativistic and non-relativistic cases – fundamental in the sense of
being non-supervenient upon intrinsic 23 properties and of involving non-separability. To the
extent that quantum theory is our best physical theory about matter, this constitutes a strong
empirical argument against the traditional atomist metaphysics of intrinsic properties and in
favour of the structural realist account proposed in this paper, at least as far as matter is
concerned. However, one may still wonder whether such a structural realist account provides
a coherent metaphysics of space-time that accords with our contemporary fundamental
physical description of it. Therefore, we now turn to the case of space-time as described by
the theory of general relativity (GR).
3. The argument from space-time
At first sight and in a realist (substantivalist) move, it seems that the standard mathematical
representation of space-time within contemporary physics in terms of a set of points endowed
with certain topological, smooth differential and metric properties – the standard manifold
description of space-time – constitutes a straightforward implementation of atomistic
metaphysics such as David Lewis’ thesis of Humean supervenience. Indeed, such
representation of space-time seems to fit well into the conception of the world as a
distribution of fundamental intrinsic properties (together with space-time relations)
instantiated at space-time points or events, which then play the role of atoms in the
philosophical sense. Whereas such a conception fares well with the non-general-relativistic
representation of space-time as a fixed background, it, however, faces some serious
difficulties within GR.
In this framework and in the standard formulation of the theory, space-time is represented
by a four-dimensional smooth differentiable manifold – the above mentioned set of points
with topological and smooth differential properties – together with a Lorentz metric tensor
field, or metric for short, defined on it. This latter geometric object encodes the fundamental
space-time relations, like the chronogeometrical relations (space-time intervals), the inertio-
gravitational relations (describing the behaviour of freely falling test particles in a
gravitational field – the metric field and the gravitational field being one and the same field
within GR) and the causal relations (defining a light cone at each space-time point and
providing a distinction between spatial and temporal directions). One of the major novelties
of GR is that the metric, incorporating the fundamental relations of the space-time structure,
is fundamentally dynamical: it is related to the behaviour of the (non-gravitational) energy-
matter (“ordinary” 24 energy-matter), represented by the stress-energy tensor field, through
the (non-linear) dynamical equations – the Einstein field equations – it satisfies.
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In this section, we mainly consider the pure gravitational cases, that is, the physical
solutions of the Einstein field equations with vanishing non-gravitational stress-energy tensor
(roughly, they are descriptions of space-time without “ordinary” energy-matter). This does
not alter the main argument in favour of the metaphysical thesis of structural realism, nor
does it make this argument dependent on a specific position with respect to the ontological
status of space-time. We briefly discuss at the end of this section the link with this long-
standing debate.
The important feature of GR for our considerations is the principle of active general
covariance. This principle tells us that if we have a space-time model of GR, that is, a solution
of the Einstein field equations, then any active diffeomorphism applied on this model will
generate a space-time model of GR. An active diffeomorphism is a differentiable, one-to-one
and onto mapping (with differentiable inverse) acting on the Lorentz metric and stress-energy
tensor fields defined on the manifold. Such diffeomorphic models are observationally
indistinguishable. However, in a substantivalist move and according to the traditional
metaphysics of individuals applied to space-time, these diffeomorphic models have to be
interpreted as describing distinct physical situations, since any given space-time point or
event (merely represented by a manifold point from this perspective) is individuated by some
intrinsic properties independently of the space-time relations represented by the metric. It will
therefore be “coloured” by different metrical properties in the different diffeomorphic models.
For instance, the question whether the metric (or gravitational) field is flat around some
specific space-time point may receive different answers in the different diffeomorphic
models.
The famous hole argument, originally due to Einstein, shows that such an attitude towards
diffeomorphic models leads to a kind of indeterminism (see Earman & Norton (1987)): we
consider a hole in the space-time manifold, that is, an open subset of the manifold where all
non-gravitational fields vanish. We furthermore consider a non-trivial active diffeomorphism
on the hole that smoothly reduces to the trivial diffeomorphism, that is, the identity, on the
boundary and outside the hole. A complete physical model outside the hole is then
insufficient to determine a unique physical solution inside the hole, since, within the
substantivalist and atomistic metaphysical framework, diffeomorphic models represent
distinct situations. More 25 precisely, considering a space-time manifold that can be foliated,
the “hole” can be chosen to be the portion of the manifold after a certain time t in the
considered foliation. But then, two physically possible models, which are related by a ‘hole
diffeomorphism’ and in which we consider the same foliation, may agree till a time t and then
disagree for any time t' > t in the foliation. This constitutes a breakdown of common
determinism, and no unique evolution can be determined from a set of initial data (in the
initial value formulation of the theory).
Since diffeomorphic models are observationally indistinguishable, it is then generally
argued that such indeterminism is not an empirically supported feature of the physical theory,
but rather an artifact of the (metaphysical) conception of space-time that implies the physical
non-equivalence of diffeomorphic models. Indeed, a wide range of philosophers of physics
and physicists agree on the fact that this non-equivalence and the hole argument itself are a
consequence of the non-physical primary individuation of space-time points independently of
the metric (see for instance Stachel (1993), Brighouse (1994), Hoefer (1996), Dorato (2000),
Pooley (forthcoming)). In other words, space-time points are not individuals independently of
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the space-time relations they enter into, which are represented by the metric; they do not
possess any primitive thisness (haecceity) or intrinsic properties that would turn them into
individuals over and above bearing the space-time relations. Therefore, with respect to space-
time, the fundamental GR-principle of active general covariance, which underlies the hole
argument, constitutes a strong empirical argument against the traditional atomistic
metaphysics of individuals. On the contrary, the (holistic) metaphysical framework of
structural realism provides a convincing and coherent account of the physical description of
space-time provided by GR. Indeed, with respect to active general covariance and the GR-
representation of space-time in terms of a manifold with a dynamical metric that encodes all
the fundamental space-time relations, space-time can be naturally understood as a purely
relational physical structure, that is, a network of space-time relations among space-time
points that do not possess any intrinsic properties.
Moreover, the space-time structure described by GR is such that the space-time relations
and the objects that stand in the relations (the space-time points or events) are on the same
(fundamental) ontological footing. On the one hand and in an analogous way to the general
case discussed in the first section, it makes no sense to consider an actual (that is, instantiated
in the physical world) space-time relation without relata standing in the relation – space-time
points or events in the pure gravitational cases. 26 On the other hand, the physical description
of space-time within GR (and in particular the principle of active general covariance) makes
meaningless any individuation of space-time points (with the help of intrinsic properties or of
primitive thisness for instance) independently of the space-time relations they inter into or
independently of the space-time structure they are part of – both being represented by the
metric. Space-time points do not possess any independent existence (they are not atoms in the
philosophical sense), but only exist in virtue of their standing in relation to other space-time
points. There is no ontological priority, but rather a mutual ontological dependence between
space-time relations and space-time points.
As regards individuation and identity conditions for space-time points, we argue, as
explained in the first section, that space-time relations, which are concrete and determinate
relations, are on a par with intrinsic properties. In a space-time with no symmetries, a space-
time point can be individuated, at least in principle, through the unique way it stands in
(space-time) relations to other space-time points. A concrete physical implementation of such
individuation within GR is the Bergmann-Komar assignment to space-time points of four
scalar polynomials of the curvature, where the curvature can be understood as a functional of
the metric (for recent developments, see Lusanna & Pauri (2004)). What about the cases with
symmetries, like for instance the homogeneous and isotropic Friedman-Lemaître-Robertson-
Walker solutions, which constitute the ‘standard model’ of contemporary cosmology? In
these cases, the above mentioned individuation procedure becomes degenerated and, in
general, no properties – intrinsic or relational – seem to be able to provide well-defined
identity conditions for space-time points. However, this is not a difficulty for the structural
conception of space-time points (and of objects in general, see section 1) proposed here, since
in this metaphysical framework, space-time points and space-time relations are on the same
ontological footing: the numerical distinction of space-time points is neither reduced to space-
time relations nor grounded independently of them (by some intrinsic properties or primitive
thisness). Therefore, the numerical distinction of space-time points can be accepted as
primitive in the same way as space-time points and space-time relations – the whole space-
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time structure indeed – can. Thus, within the structural realist interpretation of space-time,
even in the cases with symmetries, there is a metaphysically coherent notion of numerical
distinction for space-time points. As a physical consequence of this kind of ‘structural
individuality’ implied by the theory, the space-time location of any physical entity (like
‘being localized at a space-time point or in a space-time 27 region’) makes only sense within
GR with respect to the dynamical space-time structure, that is, with respect to the metric (or
gravitational) field (see Rovelli (2004), chapter 2).
The main claim of this section is that there are strong empirical arguments from
contemporary space-time physics against the traditional atomistic understanding of space-
time in terms of a set of individuals possessing intrinsic properties (together with some space-
time relations). We have seen that the holistic metaphysics of structural realism provides a
convincing and coherent account of space-time as described by GR. According to this view,
space-time is rather a network of space-time relations among constituents (space-time points)
that do not possess intrinsic properties. However, this metaphysical claim about space-time
does not constitute a clear-cut position in the debates about the ontological status of space-
time and about the relationship between space-time and (non-gravitational) energy-matter. In
particular, the structural realist conception of space-time is open with respect to whether or
not the space-time structure and (non-gravitational) energy-matter are distinct ontological
beings. If the space-time structure can be ontologically dependent on there being some non-
gravitational energy-matter, we want to stress that structural realism about space-time has
nothing to do with any kind of relationalism about space-time understood in the reductive
sense, since the space-time structure is not reduced to something non-spatio-temporal. On the
contrary, the structural realist thesis about space-time, claiming the existence of the space-
time structure, seems to be committed to some kind of substantivalism with respect to space-
time. But it leaves the question of the relationship between space-time and non-gravitational
energy-matter open – substantivalism à la Newton (matter ontologically distinct from space-
time) or substantivalism à la Spinoza (matter identical with space-time).
4. Conclusion and open issues
In the first section of this paper, we have set out structural realism as an ontological thesis
about the world. The main claim of this postion is that the physical world is at the
fundamental level a purely relational structure, that is, a network of relations among objects
that do not possess intrinsic properties. The version of structural realism that we propose is a
moderate one, since it regards relations and objects as being mutually ontologically
dependent. This position implies that there are no fundamental intrinsic propreties in nature. It
thereby avoids a gap between what we can know about the world and what the world really
consists of.
28 We have argued that this structural realist position is coherent, answering the objections
usually raised against structuralism. The Newman objection against formal structures has no
force in the case of the actual concrete relations considered by moderate structural realism.
Moreover, the metaphysics of objects provided by the moderate structural realist position
rejects any commitment to haecceitism, but it does not amount to the bundle theory of objects.
Since structure is conceived in such a way that objects and relations are ontologically on a
par, a numerical distinction among the objects can be considered as primitive in the sense of
being already incorporated into the notion of a concrete, physical structure.
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We have not only shown that the metaphysical thesis of moderate structural realism is
coherent, we have also argued in section 2 and 3 that it is strongly supported by empirical
arguments from our fundamental physical theories. Both GR and Q(F)T describe fundamental
physical relations – namely, the quantm entanglement relations and the space-time relations –
that are irreducible to and non-supervenient on intrinsic properties of the physical relata
standing in the relations. These physical relations belong therefore to the most fundamental
part of the physical descriptions of the world. In a scientific realist move, they have to be
recognized in any metaphysical framework that pays heed to contemporary physics.
Nonetheless, some work remains to be done to justify the conclusion that all the fundamental
physical features of nature are best understood in this holistic metaphysical framework. For
instance, state-independent fundamental features of quantum (field) systems, such as (rest)
mass, charge, spin, etc. seem to be good candidates for intrinsic properties (they are, however,
of no help in individuating entangled quantum (field) systems). A possible line of
investigation for the structural realist is to look at the mathematical (namely, group-theoretic)
structures in terms of which these properties are defined and which therefore may have some
physical significance.
The mutual ontological dependence between relations and objects proposed by moderate
structural realism holds whatever the relations are (quantum, spatio-temporal) and whatever
the objects are (single quantum systems, space-time points). However, it is committed to there
being some fundamental objects standing in the relations – there is no infinite regress (no
‘structures all the way down’). Ultimately, the structural realist’s understanding of nature is
therefore open with respect to what kind of fundamental objects and relations there are in the
world, as long as their relationship is conceived as one of mutual ontological dependence. We
therefore contend that this central idea of moderate structural realism 29 will continue to
prove sound even if current quantum field theory and general relativity will be replaced with a
new fundamental physical theory that offers a unified view of matter and space-time.
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